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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA BEYNON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

)
)
)

vs.

)
)

ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE
# 1743, BENEVOLENT &
PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS,

)
)
)

Defendant/Appellee.

DEFENDANTS FIRST CITATION OF
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITIES

Case No. 91-0551
Priority No. 16

)

Defendant St. George - Dixie Lodge # 1743, Benevolent &
Protective Order of Elks, through counsel, hereby provides the
Court with the following citations to supplemental authorities
both pertinent and significant to this case.

Defendant/Appellee

submits these citations pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

The reasons for the supplemental

citations are also set forth, as required by rule.
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SUPPLEMENTAL CITATIONS
Defendant has recently discovered the existence of three
cases addressing the issues presented on this appeal:
A.

Maine Human Rights Comm'n. v. Le Club Calumet,
The first supplemental citation offered by defendant is

Maine Human Rights Comm'n. v. Le Club Calumet, 609 A.2d 285 (Me.
1992).

The decision of the Supreme Court of Maine in Le Club

Calumet is significant to this case for a number of reasons:
1.

In Le Club Calumet, the Maine Supreme Court held that

the state's Human Rights Act did not prohibit Le Club Calumet
from limiting its membership practices to males only.

This

supports the argument made by defendant in Point I of its brief
(pp. 11-33) that the male-only membership practices of the Elks
Lodge are not prohibited under the Utah Civil Rights Act.
2.

In Le Club Calumet the court found it significant that

the defendant was "a fraternal organization with the primary
purpose of propagating the french language. . . . "

Id. at 286.

The court further found it significant that the general public
could not attend the club's private meetings, even though the
public could attend other public social functions held by the
club.

These facts are similar to the facts asserted on pages 3-8

of defendant's brief, wherein it is shown that the Elks Lodge is
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also a fraternal organization that has as its central activity a
weekly membership meeting that can only be attended by members of
the lodge.
3.

In Le Club Calumet the court held that Le Club Calumet

did not fit within the scope of the Human Rights Act because it
was not a "place of public accommodation."

A place of "public

accommodation" was defined by the statutes of Maine as "any
establishment which in fact caters to, or offers its goods,
facilities or services to, or solicits or accepts patronage from,
the general public."

jDd.

(emphasis added).

The Supreme Court

held that Le Club Calumet did npt satisfy this definition.

Le

Club Calumetf s holding directly supports the argument made in
Point I of defendant's brief that defendant is not a "business
establishment" within the meaning of the Utah Civil Rights Act.
4.

In Le Club Calumet the court found it significant that

there was "no evidence that club membership [was] essential to
the maintenance of social or business opportunities in the . . .
community."

3^d. at 287. This fact is pertinent to the instant

case because the statement of facts contained in appellant's
brief similarly fail to allege that the admission practices of
the Elks Lodge have had any adverse consequence on plaintiff's
business dealings.
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B.

Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America.
The second supplemental citation offered by defendant is

Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 787 F. Supp. 1511 (N.D. 111.
1992).

This case is significant to the instant case for a number

of reasons:
1.

Welsh held that the Boy Scouts of America organization

does not fall within the scope of the Federal Civil Rights Act.
The court explained that the Act only applies to "places of
public accommodation" and concluded that the Boy Scouts is not a
"place."

In so holding, the court stated that the term "place"

was not simply a term of convenience, but rather was intended to
limit the scope of the Civil Rights Act.

The court further

stated that "place" should be given its customary meaning.
at 1530, 1534, 1537-39.

Id.

These observations are analogous to the

points made in pages 22-25 of defendant's brief, wherein
defendant argues that the Elks Lodge is not included within the
scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act because it is not a
"business."

As in Welsh, plaintiff has argued that the term

"business" is simply a term of convenience that adds nothing to
the Act, while defendant has argued that "business" limits the
scope of the Act and must be interpreted according to its
ordinary meaning.
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Welsh suggests that "business" is in fact a
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limitation on the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act, as argued
in pages 22-25 of defendant's brief.
2.

In Welsh the court set forth 63 paragraphs of facts.

Id. at 1514-21. All of the facts set forth were considered to be
relevant to a determination of whether an entity falls within the
scope of a civil rights act.

Id. at 1514 N.2. These facts are

pertinent to the instant case because they are very similar to
the statements of fact found in pages 3-8 of defendant's brief.
3.

Welsh was held to be distinguishable from two key cases

relied upon by plaintiff throughout her various briefs:

Curran

v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 195 Cal.
Rpt. 325 (1983), and United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d
764 (Minn. 1981).
4.

See Welsh, 787 F. Supp. at 1530.

Welsh refused to follow United States Power Squadron's

v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd, 452 N.E.2d 1199 (N.Y. 1983), a
case relied upon by plaintiff on pages 16-17 of her second reply
brief.
C.

Id.

United States Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n.
The third supplemental citation offered by defendant is

United states Jaycees v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n., 427 N.W.2d
450 (Iowa 1988) (en banc).

Jaycees is pertinent and significant

to this case for a number of reasons:
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1.

Jaycees declined to follow United States Jaycees v.

McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Minn. 1981), a case relied upon
by plaintiff on page 11 of her second reply brief2.

Id. at 453.

Jaycees was held to be distinguishable from two key

cases relied upon by plaintiff throughout her various briefs:
Board of Directors of Rotary Intfl v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537 (1987), and Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 486 U.S.
609 (1984).
3.

See Jaycees, 427 N.W.2d at 453.

Jaycees held that the Iowa Civil Rights Act did not

prohibit the Jaycees organization from denying membership to
females because the Act only applied to "places of public
accommodation."

"Public accommodation" was defined very broadly

to include "every place, establishment, or facility of whatever
kind, nature, or class that caters or offers services,
facilities, or goods to the general public. . . . "
(emphasis added).

Id. at 452

The Iowa Supreme Court held that the Jaycees

was not a "place" or an "establishment" under this definition.
Id. at 454. These holdings are synonymous with Point I of
defendant's brief, which similarly asserts that the Elks Lodge is
not included within the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act
because it is not a "business establishment."
4.
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Jaycees held that "place" and "establishment," as used
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in the Civil Rights Act, should be given their ordinary and
customary meanings.

This supports the argument made by defendant

on pages 22-25 of its brief that the term "business" should be
given its ordinary meaning when interpreting the Utah Civil
Rights Act.
As demonstrated, the three supplemental authorities cited
above are pertinent and significant to a resolution of this case.
Defendant therefore urges this court to consider these additional
authorities prior to ruling on plaintifffs appeal.
DATED this rJ
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day of December, 1992.
;
STRONG & HAN!

.enn T . Hanni
David R. Nielson
Attorneys for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this r)\^

day of December, 1992,

I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, by placing
such in the United States mail, first class postage prepaid, and
addressed to:
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Brian M. Barnard
John Pace
Utah Civil Rights & Liberties Foundation,
Inc.
Utah Legal Clinic
214 East Fifth South street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Frank Mylar
Assistant Attorney General
6100 South 300 East #204
Murray, Utah 84107
Leonard J. Solfa, Jr.
Attorney for Amicus curiae (CONPOR)
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